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876 PEOPLE v. DAUGHERTY [40 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5366. In Bank. May 5, 1953.] 
THE PEOPIJE, Hespondent, v. JOSEPH A. DAUGHEHTY, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence.-A conviction of first degree murder is 
sustained by evidence that defendant threatened to do things 
to his wife because he thought she was disloyal to him, that 
a few hours before the crime he told a cab driver, after 
visiting his wife, "she thinks she is smart but I will show her," 
that later he returned to his wife's house, severed the tele-
phone line on the outside of the house, forced an entry, dis-
played a hunting knife, pursued her from the house into the 
yard and fatally stabbed her, and that on his arrest he told an 
officer, "The slut, I fixed her." 
[2] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Degree 
of Offense.-Rule that where evidence is open to two equally 
reasonable constructions, one pointing to guilt of a higher 
degree of crime, and the other to guilt of a lesser degree, the 
court must adopt the theory pointing to guilt of the lesser 
degree, is not correct when applied to consideration of case by 
an appellate court, but applies to the trier of fact only. (Dis-
approving People v. Jiminez, 95 Cal.App.2d 840, 214 P.2d 15.) 
[3] Id.-New Trial-Hearing and Determination: Appeal-Reduc-
tion of Punishment Imposed.-In neither a hearing on a mo-
tion for new trial nor on appeal may the court reduce the 
degree of the crime unless the evidence is legally insufficient 
to support the higher degree of which defendant was convicted, 
and in determining that. question the evidence, even if cir-
cumstantial, is not weighed. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1181(6), 
1260.) 
[ 4] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Reasonable Doubt. 
-The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence 
to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, and not whether 
guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 145(2); [2, 5] Criminal 
Law, § 1309; [3] Criminal Law, §§ 969, 1446; [4] Criminal Law, 
§ 1314; [6] Criminal Law,§ 1446; [7, 8] Homicide,§ 15; [9] Homi-
cide, § 145(3); [10, 12] Criminal Law, § 951; [11] Criminal Law, 
§ 1339(1); [13] Jury, § 108(5); [14] Jury, § 108; [15] Homicide, 
§ 161; [16] Criminal Law, § 329(1); [17] Criminal Law, § 235(1); 
[18] Criminal Law,§ 28; [19] Criminal Law,§ 1477; [20, 21] Crimi-
nal Law, § 856; [22] Homicide, § 185; [23] Criminal Law, § 766; 
[24] Homicide, § 197; [25] Criminal Law, § 363; [26] Homicide, 
§ 179(5). 
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[51 !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.--An appellate court 
will not determine the weight of the evidence, but will decide 
only whether on the face of the evidence it can be held that 
sufficient facts could not have been found by the jury to war-
rant the inference of guilt. 
[6] !d.-Appeal-Reduction of Punishment Imposed.--An appel-
late court cannot reduce the degree of a crime if there is 
substantial evidence to support the finding of a higher degree. 
[7] Homicide-Murder-First Degree-Killing by Torture.-Mur-
der is perpetrated by torture when the assailant's intent is 
to cause cruel suffering on the part of the object of the attack, 
either for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or 
to satisfy some other untoward propensity. 
[8] !d.-Murder-First Degree-Killing by Torture.-The manner 
of killing does not necessarily establish torture. 
[9] Id.-Evidence-Torture.-Evidence that defendant had threat-
ened to do things to his wife because he considered that she 
had been unfaithful to him, that his remarks both before 
and after he killed her indicated not only an intent to kill, 
but also a wish to seek vengeance on her so as to cause her 
to suffer, that at the time of the killing he was armed with 
a knife and pursued her from the house into the yard, that 
the size of the area where the blood was found indicated that 
his pursuit and stabbing of her covered an appreciable time, 
that dirt-filled abrasions of her thigh indicated that he must 
have dragged her along the ground, and that when she was 
lying on the ground he stood over her and kicked her, sustains 
conclusion of jury that murder was perpetrated by torture. 
[10] Criminal Law-New Trial-Misconduct of Jury.-Alleged 
false statement of juror on her voir dire examination that she 
did not know defendant's counsel who conducted trial is not 
ground for a new trial, and in any event is not prejudicial to de-
fendant, where there is some doubt as to whether the juror 
was the same person to whom letters of a brother of one of 
defendant's counsel were sent, the juror had no reason to 
believe that such brother was a partner in the law firm con-
ducting the defense, the letters do not necessarily indicate 
that the juror would be angered with such brother, and the 
juror had given her sworn statement that she would be im-
partial. 
[11] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Findings on Mo-
tion for New Trial.-Where affidavit of juror on motion for 
new trial creates a conflict with an inference from a certain 
conversation that she had prejudged the case, trial court's 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 12 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 15. 
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resolution of that conflict against defendant is binding on 
a reviewing court. 
[12] Id.-New Trial-Misconduct of Jury.-Statement by juror in 
answer to question as to how she arrived at verdict so quickly, 
"Well, we already knew it," does not necessarily indicate a 
prejudgment of the case, as a basis for a new trial, since she 
may merely have meant that a short time after the case was 
submitted to the jury it knew how it felt about the matter. 
[13] Jury-Challenges for Cause-Review-Adjudication on Abil-
ity to Disregard Opinion.-Challenge of a juror for actual 
bias for opinion formed from reading a newspaper is properly 
denied under Pen. Code, § 1076, in view of juror's affirmative 
reply to court's question whether he could act fairly and im-
partially in the light of the evidence received. 
[14] !d.-Challenges for Cause-Review-Conclusiveness of Ad-
judication.-H challenged juror's testimony with respect to 
test regarding his impartiality despite opinion formed from 
reading newspaper is conflicting, trial court's resolution of 
that conflict is binding on an appellate court. 
[15] Homicide-Trial-Fairness.-Bias and prejudice of the jury 
is not established by the fact that the jury reached a verdict 
of guilty of first degree murder in an hour and a quarter 
where, although the record consists of some 1,274 pages, 
there was no question that defendant killed his wife, and the 
evidence is adequate to show torture, premeditation, and that 
his mind was not so affected by alcohol and illness as to pre-
clude him from forming the requisite intent. 
[16] Criminal Law-Conduct of Judge or Court-Particular Re-
marks.-Trial court was not guilty of misconduct which de-
prived defendant of a fair trial on the issue of sanity in a 
homicide case because immediately after jury brought in ver-
dict that defendant was guilty of first degree murder the 
court remarked that the jury discharged its duty conscien-
tiously and "in my opinion, as the evidence i:h the case war-
ranted," and because the last witness to testify on issue of 
defendant's guilt was the People's rebuttal witness who 
testified that defendant had the mental capacity to form an 
intent and was capable of premeditation, where both at the 
beginning and at the end of the trial the court told the jury 
that they were the sole judges of the evidence and of the 
credibility of witnesses, and where other doctors testified that 
defendant was sane. 
[17] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity.-Pen. Code, 
§§ 1016, 1026, providing for a double plea of not guilty and 
not guilty by reason of insanity and a bifurcated trial on the 
issues, do not violate the due process clauses of the federal 
and state Constitutions. 
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[18] Id.-Ment.al Condition-Sanity.-Legal sanity, in a criminal 
case, means reasoning capacity sufficient to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong as to the particular act the accused 
is doing, and knowledge and consciousness that what he is 
doing is wrong and criminal and will subject him to punish-
ment. 
[19] Id.- Punishment- Cruel or Unusual Punishments.- Pen. 
Code, § 3604, providing that punishment of death shall be 
inflicted by the administration of "a lethal gas," is not invalid 
as permitting the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment 
contrary to the federal Constitution. 
[20] !d.-Instructions-Reasonable Doubt.-An instruction in a 
homicide ease on reasonable doubt in the language of Pen. 
Code, § 1096, and stating that the plea of not guilty is 
a denial by defendant of each and every element of the offense 
charged, that the duty is on the prosecution to prove every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime, that guilt must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's plea 
of not guilty puts in issue every fact alleged in the indictment 
and every material element of the crime, that in every crime 
there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent, 
that specific intent is an element of the offense charged, 
and presents a question of fact which must be proved like 
any other fact in the case, etc., sufficiently advises the jury 
that not only the crime but also the intent must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[21] !d.-Instructions-Reasonable Doubt.-Unde~: the statute no 
instruction on reasonable doubt other than that specified in 
Pen. Code, § 1096, need be given. (Pen Code, § 1096a.) 
[22] Homicide-Instructions-Murder-Torture.-In a homicide 
case, instructions on torture in the language of a Supreme 
Court decision defining torture are proper. 
[23] Criminal Law-Instructions-Insanity.-On a trial of a plea 
of not guilty by reason of insanity, an instruction that de-
fendant need not prove his insanity beyond a reasonable 
doubt but need only prove it by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, defining the latter clause, is correct. 
[24] Homicide-Instructions-Insanity.-An instruction in the in-
sanity stage of a homicide trial, that "the burden on the 
prosecution of proving the sanity of the defendant at the 
time of the commission of the crime of which he has been 
found guilty, namely, murder of the first degree, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, is met by the presumption of sanity, and 
[18] Subnormal mentality as defense to crime, note, 44 A.L.R. 
.584. See, also, Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 21; Am.Jur., Criminal 
Law, §§ 33, 40. 
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the burden of establishing the defense of insanity of the 
defendant is upon him, to establish such insanity at the time 
of the commission of the crime of which he has been convicted, 
by a preponderance of the evidence," while confusing and 
should not have been given, may reasonably be interpreted to 
mean that even though the prosecution was relieved of proving 
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, yet defendant could estab-
lish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 
[25] Criminal Law- Burden of Proof- Insanity.- While the 
burden of proving sanity is on the prosecution in the sanity 
stage of a criminal trial, the burden is on defendant to prove 
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 
[26] Homicide-Instructions-Deliberation and Intent.-Instruc-
tions on deliberation and intent are proper in a homicide case 
where the jury is told that to constitute first degree murder 
the killing must be by torture as defined, or wilful act 
accompanied by malice together with a clear and deliberate 
intent to take life, that the intent must be the result of 
deliberation and must be formed on preexisting reflection and 
not under heat of passion or such other condition as to pre-
clude deliberation, that the true test is not the duration of 
time but rather the extent of the reflection, and that to 
constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer 
must weigh and consider the question of killing and the 
reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the 
consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act causing 
death. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sonoma County 
and from an order denying a new trial. Donald Geary, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. .Judgment of conviction of first 
degree murder, affirmed. 
Mancuso, Herron & Winn and ,John Wynne Herron for 
Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and 
Leo V. Mcinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, and Joseph 
Maddux, District Attorney (Sonoma), for Respondent. 
CAR'rER, J.-'rhis case comes to us by automatic appeal 
from a judgment of conviction of first degree murder im-
posing the death penalty, finding defendant sane, and from 
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an order denying a new trial. Defendant made the twofold 
plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Defendant is a man about 50 years of age. He married 
.B-,lorena Daugherty, the victim of the homicide, in 1933, and 
they had five children, Barbara, Michael, Wanda, Margaret, 
and Jerry. The killing occurred in the early morning hours of 
February 28, 1952. Defendant did not testify at the trial 
and there was little dispute that he killed his wife Florena, 
the main contention being that his mind had so deteriorated 
from illness and the consumption of alcoholic beverages that 
he was incapable of premeditation or of forming the intent to 
commit murder. 
[1] The homicide took place at the Daugherty family home 
on the outskirts of Santa Rosa, California. Defendant had 
not been living at the home for about a month before the 
time of the crime, having moved to an apartment in town. 
Prior to the homicide the relation between defendant and 
Flo rena had been strained. Barbara, the 17 -year-old daughter 
of the couple, testified that for several years prior thereto 
they had engaged in constant quarrels and arguments with 
the defendant accusing Florena of infidelity. On one occasion 
in 1951, defendant struck Barbara and was arrested therefor. 
He had made threats against Florena, stating that "he would 
come back and get us.'' In December, 1951, defendant had 
been drinking heavily. He seemed to think his wife was dis-
loyal to him, and while armed with a gun, went looking for 
her at the house of a tenant nearby his own home. He then 
fired some shots in the air. Early in 1952, defendant com-
menced a divorce action against Florena and on the morning 
of February 27, 1952, the day before the night of the crime, 
obtained an interlocutory decree by default. He attended to 
his business, seeming normal, and left a beauty shop owned 
by him at 4 :30 p. m. From about 6 :30 to 10 :00 p. m. he was 
with Mrs. Case, an employee, and a friend, Oliver, at either 
Mrs. Case's apartment or his own, where he consumed con-
siderable whiskey but appeared to be rational. Several wit-
nesses saw defendant between 10 and 11 :30 p. m., and they 
testified that he had consumed whiskey, some of them said he 
was drunk, others said that he was not drunk but was in 
high spirits. Between 11 and 11 :30 p. m. he called a taxi 
driver by the name of Bickel from a cafe in Santa Rosa. 
Bickel drove him to the Daugherty home. Bickel testified that 
defendant was in good spirits and happy drunk but acted 
rationally. While he waited for defendant outside the 
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Daugherty home, he saw the defendant and Florena in the 
dining room. Defendant waived a white piece of paper at her 
(inferentially the interlocutory divorce decree) and she tried 
to push him out of the house. Defendant left and on return-
ing to the cab stated : ''The God damned dirty bitch, she 
thinks she is smart but I will show her" that he had gotten 
his ''clincher'' today and he ''just went out there to show 
her my clincher.'' Bickel returned the defe~tdant to his apart-
ment at about 11 :30 p. m. Between 1 :30 and 2 :30 a. m. de-
fendant was observed endeavoring to back his car out of his 
garage and the observer said he was drunk. Defendant called 
on Mrs. Case and she also considered him drunk. From the 
testimony of various witnesses and the permissible inferences 
therefrom, defendant then drove to the Daugherty home and 
parked his car. Florena, and all the children with the ex-
ception of Barbara, were at home. Defendant severed the 
telephone line on the outside of the house and forced an 
entry. Florena locked herself in the bedroom but at his 
insistence let him in. Defendant was holding a hunting knife 
in his upraised hand, evidently having come .. to the house 
armed with it, but put it in his belt at her request. She fled 
from the house to the yard and he followed her. While there 
were no eyewitnesses to the crime, he was observed kicking 
her while she was lying in the yard and he was standing over 
her. Defendant left and the children, at Florena 's request, 
went to summon help. A neighbor responded, and saw Florena 
lying on her back in the yard, nude. She was alive and con-
scious. He drove to town for the police and on their arrival 
she was still alive, lying nude, her body having blood on it. 
An ambulance was summoned, and she was taken away. There 
was blood at various places in the yard and at the door 
of the house. There were abrasions on her thigh with particles 
of dirt therein, indicating she had been dragged. Her body 
contained numerous stab wounds, including some on the upper 
part of her arm, shoulder, near hip joint, abdomen and fore-
arm. The cartilage of her nose was broken. The fatal wound 
was on the side of the left breast and was 3 inches wide and 
6 inches deep. The evidence showed that the wound had 
penetrated the heart and would cause death from internal 
hemorrhage. In addition to the blood in the yard, which 
covered a considerable area, a blood-stained hunting knife 
and her torn nightdress were found. A knife scabbard whose 
inside configuration fit the knife was found at defendant's 
apartment. 
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,Just prior to his arrest (about 3 a. m. on the day of the 
crime), defendant made telephone calls to several different 
persons to whom he stated that he had killed his wife. At 
the time of his arrest in his office, there was blood on his shirt 
and pants and about his office and car. Although defendant 
refused to make a formal statement to the peace officers, when 
he was asked what had happened at the home place, he 
stopped, gritted his teeth, and shook his fist at the ground, 
and said: ''I stood there and watched the dirty son of a bitch 
die; I couldn't take it any longer." ·when taken to the 
sheriff's office and examined, he had the divorce decree on 
his person. He did not appear drunk and while there he told 
an officer, ''I told her not to push me too far; I told her not 
to push me too far or I would fix her and I did. . . . 'fhe slut, 
I fixed her." 
'fhe foregoing summary of the evidence is clearly sufficient 
to establish intentional, premeditated and deliberate murder, 
or murder in the first degree. 
As before stated, the main defense at the trial was that 
defendant was so deranged by alcohol and illness, that he 
was incapable of forming an intent or of premeditation. 
There was evidence, as above seen, that he was intoxicated on 
the night in question and evidence to the contrary. He had 
witnesses in his defense who testified to his intoxication then, 
and overindulgence in alcohol for a considerable period of 
time prior thereto, coupled with his suffering from Buerger's 
Disease and other ailments; that defendant had changed and 
was sullen and morose. His personal physician testified that 
defendant was suffering from heart disease, ulcers, bladder 
trouble, Buerger's Disease and chronic alcoholism and, be-
cause of those things, that when he committed the offense he 
did not have the capacity to form the intent to commit 
murder. However, on rebuttal, the prosecution called Dr. 
Toller, a psychiatrist, who testified that he did have such 
capacity as shown by his activities on the night in question. 
Defendant relies on recent cases by this court in support 
of his contention that there was insufficient evidence to estab-
lish premeditation as lately defined by this court. The facts 
in those cases are not comparable to the one here presented. 
Defendant stresses the language in People v. Howard, 211 
Cal. 322 [295 P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 1385], that there was no evi-
dence of the surrounding circumstances at the time of the 
killing. Here, as above outlined, we have such evidence and, 
together with the inferences to be drawn therefrom, it is 
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sufficient. In People v. Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59 [153 P.2d 21], a 
previous threat to kill was held insufficient but that was in 
the background of defendant's testimony that the deceased 
was advancing upon him when he shot him and he fired but 
one shot which was not immediately fatal. Here many wounds 
were inflicted and defendant had pursued Florena. Reli-
ance is also placed on People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880 [156 
P.2d 7], but there the court held the evidence sufficient. 
Evidence such as exists here was not present in People v. 
Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164 [163 P.2d 8], where the only "ration-
ale" was a "tempestuous quarrel, hot anger and a violent 
killing." Special reliance is placed upon People v. Jiminez, 
95 Cal.App.2d 840 [214 P.2d 15]. In that case there was 
not all the evidence of threats and statements made by de-
fendant, as well as evidence of torture, shown by the record 
here. [2] The statement therein that courts are bound by 
the rule that where evidence is open to two equally reason-
able constructions, one of which points to the guilt of de-
fendant of a higher degree of crime, and the other to his guilt 
of a lesser degree, the court must adopt the theory pointing 
to guilt of the lesser degree, is not a correct statement of 
law when applied to the consideration of a case by an ap-
pellate court. That rule applies to the trier of fact only, 
be it jury or trial court, the same as doet! section 1096 which 
deals with reasonable doubt. The cobrt in the Jiminez 
case cites section 1097 of the Penal Code' which reads: "When 
it appears that the defendant has coqj.mitted a public offense, 
and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two or 
more degrees he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest 
of such degrees only." But that section is in a chapter of 
the code dealing with the trial of a case. Also cited in the 
Jiminez case are People v. Golembiewski, 25 Cal.App.2d 115 
[76 P.2d 717] and People v. Daniel, 65 Cal.App.2d 622 [151 
P.2d 275]. In the Golembiewski case there was no evidence 
of the higher offense and the court was speaking of the duty 
of the trier of fact. [3] The Daniel case relied on the rule 
in connection with the power of the trial court to reduce the 
degree of the crime under section 1181 ( 6) of the Penal Code, 
but we held the rule was the same under that section ( 1181 ( 6) ) 
as it was under section 1260 of the Penal Code and in neither 
case may the court reduce the degree of the crime unless the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the higher degree 
of which defendant was convicted, and in determining that 
question, the evidence, even if circumstantial, is not weighed. 
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(People v. Odle, 37 Cal.2d 52 [230 P.2d 345] .) [4] The test 
on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the conclusion of the trier of fact. It is not whether guilt 
is established beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Stephens, 
66 Cal.App.2d 755 [152 P.2d 1019]; People v. Wright, 94 
Cal.App.2d 70 [210 P.2d 263] .) [5] The rule is stated in 
People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778], reject-
ing a contrary statement in People v. Lamson, 1 Ca1.2d 648 
[36 P.2d 361] and People v. Staples, 149 Cal. 405 [86 P. 886] : 
''The rule applicable where there is evidence, circumstantial 
or otherwise, that a crime has been committed and that the 
defendant was the perpetrator thereof, has been many times 
reiterated by the reviewing courts of this state as follows-: 
The court on appeal 'will not attempt to determine the weight 
of the evidence, but will decide only whether upon the face 
of the evidence it can be held that sufficient facts could not 
have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt. 
For it is the function of the jury in the first instance, and 
of the trial court after verdict, to determine what facts are 
established by the evidence, and before the verdict of the jury, 
which has been approved by the trial court, can be set aside 
on appeal upon the ground' of insufficiency of the evidence, 
'it must be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis 
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support 
the conclusion reached in the court below. The determina-
tion of a charge in a criminal case involves proof of two dis-
tinct propositions: First, that the offense charged was com-
mitted, and second, that it was perpetrated by the person or 
persons accused thereof. . . . We must assume in favor of 
the verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could 
have reasonably deduced from the evidence, and then deter-
mine whether such facts are sufficient to support the verdict.' 
If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury, 
the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances 
might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the 
defendant will not warrant interference with the determina-
tion of the jury. (People v. Perkins. 8 Ca1.(2d) 502 [66 P.2d 
631] ; . . . ) In the Perkins case this court expressly rejected 
the application of the statement from the Staples case to a 
situation which involved only circumstantial evidence. As 
pointed out by the court the rule that the circumstances re-
lied upon by the prosecution must be consistent with guilt 
and inconsistent with an hypothesis of innocence is a rule of 
instruction for the jury, and is not the rule for the guidance 
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of the court on review. It said : 'The rule above announced 
does no more than to instruct the jury that, if a reasonable 
doubt is created in their minds for any reason, they must 
acquit the defendant. But, where the jury rejects the hypoth-
esis pointing to innocence by its verdict, and there is evidence 
to support the implied finding of guilt as the more reasonable 
of the two hypotheses, this court is bound by the finding of 
the jury.' " That rule has been consistently followed. (Peo-
ple v. Reed, 38 Cal.2d 423 [240 P.2d 590] ; People v. Cullen, 
37 Cal.2d 614 [ 234 P .2d l] ; People v. Jones, 36 Cal.2d 37.3 
[224 P.2d 353] ; see cases collected and discussion, 4 Cal.Jur. 
10-Yr.Supp. [1943 Rev.], pp. 967-971.) [6] Without doubt 
the same rule applies in determining whether the evidence 
does or does not support a conviction of a higher degree of 
a crime, and an appellate court cannot reduce the degree if 
there is substantial evidence to support the finding of a higher 
degree. The same comments are applicable to the other cases 
relied upon by defendant. 
In connection with the claimed insufficiency of the evidence, 
defendant asserts there was no evidence of torture. (Murder 
committed by torture is first degree. Pen. Code, § 189.) There 
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find tor-
ture. [7] Murder is perpetrated by torture "when 'the 
assailant's intent was to cause cruel suffering on the part of 
the object of the attack, either for the purpose of revenge, 
extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy some other untoward pro-
pensity.' (People v. Tttbby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 77 [207 P.2d 51] ; 
People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 177 [163 P.2d 8].)" (People 
v. Martinez, 38 Cal.2d 556, 561 [241 P.2d 224] .) [8] The 
manner of the killing does not necessarily establish torture 
(see People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 P.2d 51]). [9] How-
ever, here the defendant husband threatened to do things 
to the wife because he considered she had been, and was, un-
faithful to him although there was no evidence to that effect. 
His remarks to Bickel, the taxi driver, before the killing 
jndicate as well as an intent to kill, a wish to seek vengeance 
on her so as to cause her to suffer. The same is true of his 
remarks after the killing. At the time of the killing he was 
armed with a knife and pursued her from the house into the 
yard and from the size of the area where blood was found, his 
pursuit and the stabbing of her must have covered an ap-
preciable time. He tore her nightgown from her, stabbed 
her several times and, from the dirt-filled abrasions on her 
thigh, must have dragged her along the ground. He evi-
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dently struck her in the face. And finally, when she was 
lying on the ground but still alive, he stood over her and 
kicked her. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury 
to conclude that the murder was perpetrated by torture. (See 
People v. Martinez, sttpra, 38 Cal.2d 556.) 
[10] On voiT' d1:r-e examination, Juror Mickelsen stated that 
although she had read about the case she had formed no 
opinion concerning it; had no conscientious scruples against 
the death penalty, the use of intoxicating liquors, or the defense 
of insanity; that she did not know Charles DeMeo, one of the 
defendant's counsel, or Sullivan, defendant's other counsel, 
who conducted the trial, or the district attorney and had had 
no contact with any of them. In support of his motion for a 
new trial, defendant produced affidavits from which it appears 
that Charles DeMeo is a member of a law firm of which J. N. 
DeMeo is also a member. Prior to the trial, the firm, through 
J. N. DeMeo, represented one Grundstrom as plaintiff in a 
divorce action. Concerning that representation and the action 
taken therein, Charles DeMeo had no actual knowledge until 
investigation after the trial. Grundstrom was granted a 
divorce and custody of the children with right of visitation 
in the defendant therein. In connection with that case, J. N. 
DeMeo had written two letters to a Mrs. Peter Michelsen, 
Route 4, Box 135, Petaluma, California. (The Mrs. Mickelsen 
who was on the jury appears under the name of Mrs. Leda 
F. Mickelsen, Bodega Highway, Route 4, Box 199, Petaluma.) 
In the first letter (July 16, 1950), J. N. DeMeo wrote her 
that Grundstrom had complained that she had endeavored 
to entice one of the children away from him and that if she 
did not desist, Grundstrom would have to forbid her seeing 
the child. In the second letter (March 26, 1952) J. N. DeMeo 
stated that Grundstrom had again complained; that she had 
ignored the former letter, and that the child could visit her 
once a week for two and one-half hours; that she was to stop 
the above mentioned activities, or legal action would be taken . 
. A.pparently the Mrs. Mickelsen to whom the letters were ad-
dressed was the maternal grandmother of the child. No answers 
to the letters were received. It was further stated in the affi-
davits that had counsel known of the situation they would 
have pursued an inquiry as a, basis for challenge for cause 
or would have exercised a peremptory challenge against Mrs. 
Mickelsen. Defendant claims that the letters would cause 
Mrs. Mickelsen to be unfriendly towards the DeMeos and 
that a fair trial was denied because of Mrs. Mickelsen's false 
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testimony on the voir dire that she did not know and had no 
eontact with any of the attorneys in the case. There may have 
been some doubt as to whether Juror Mickelsen and the one to 
whom the letters were sent were the same person for the names 
and addresses are to some extent different. Aside from that, 
however, we do not believe defendant suffered prejudice. 
Mrs. Mickelsen was technically truthful in her answer that 
she had no contact with any of the attorneys in the case for 
she had had none with Charles DeMeo who was in court 
assisting with defendant's defense. The letters were written 
by J. N. DeMeo, and as far as appears, she had never seen 
either of them and had no reason to believe they were part-
ners. It is very doubtful if she realized that there was any con-
nection between Charles DeMeo and the incident of the letters. 
If anything, Charles DeMeo, as a partner, might have J. N. 
DeMeo's knowledge imputed to him. The letters do not neces-
sarily indicate that Mrs. Mickelsen would be angered with 
J. N. DeMeo. A.t least not to the extent that she would carry 
it over to Charles. In addition, she had given her sworn state-
ment that she would be impartial. Moreover, she made affi-
davit on the motion for a new trial, ''That before being 
selected as a trial juror in said cause, and while being ques-
tioned on voire dire examination, affiant stated under oath 
that she had no fixed opinion regarding the merits of the case 
which would prevent her from trying the case solely upon 
the evidence adduced at the trial. That during the course of 
the said trial affiant frequently heard the admonition of the 
trial judge that the jurors should not form or express any 
opinion about the merits of the case until it was finally sub-
mitted to them, and affiant hereby states that she faithfully 
observed said admonition. That during the trial of the said 
case and before it was finally submitted to the jury affiant 
did not form or express any opinion about the merits of the 
case. 
''That during the trial, before it was submitted, affiant did 
not, at any time, express any opinion regarding the merits of 
the case, nor did affiant overhear any other member of the 
jury state any such opinion.'' 
Further in connection with Mrs. Mickelsen, the affidavit of 
one Graham was filed in which he stated that he was in the 
corridor of the courthouse after the jury had reached its 
verdict and had stated to Mrs. Mickelsen who was there, 
" 'It seems phoney that they could get a verdict that quick 
on as large a trial as that.' 
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" ... [Mrs. Mickelsen] responded: 'I am one of the jurors, 
I'm sick too. I have hemorrhoids and I haven't killed any-
body.' 
''Affiant then said: 'How did you arrive at a verdict that 
quick?' 
" ... [Mrs. Mickelsen] responded: 'Well, we already 
knew it,' and then walked away.'' 
[11] Mrs. Mickelsen's affidavit creates a conflict with any 
inference from that conversation that she had prejudged the 
case for she said she had formed no opinion and the trial 
court's resolution of that conflict against defendant is binding 
on this court. (People v. Henderson, 79 Cal.App.2d 94 [179 
P.2d 406].) [12] Moreover, her statement does not neces-
flarily indicate a prejudgment of the case for she may merely 
have meant that a short time after the case was submitted 
to the jury it knew how it felt about the matter. Nothing in 
People v. Galloway, 202 Cal. 81 [259 P. 332], requires a hold-
ing of error here. There the court was concerned with the 
question of whether bias on the part of a juror could be shown 
when it was evinced by statements made before and during 
the trial, but had been concealed by the juror on voir dire. 
·whether bias was in fact shown or what its effect may have 
been was not involved. 
Complaint is made by the defendant in regard to Juror 
Schmidt. Schmidt testified on voir dire that there was noth-
ing in his present state of mind that wonld prevent him from 
being an impartial juror except what he had read in the news-
paper; that he had an opinion based solely on what he had 
read in the newspaper as to the guilt or innocence of de-
fendant, but he had an open mind and could put it aside and 
be guided in his verdict solely by the evidence. On examination 
by defendant's counsel he said he still had the opinion he had 
formed and it would continue unless he heard evidence that 
removed it; that unless he did hear evidence to remove his 
opinion and some feeling of prejudice he would still have it 
at the end of the trial. Defendant's challenge for cause of 
Schmidt was denied, the court remarking that it did so on 
the ground that the juror had said he would cast aside his 
impression gained from reading the paper and determine the 
case on the evidence. 'l'he court then asked Schmidt whether 
he could act fairly and impartially in the light of the evi-
dence received, to which an affirmative reply was given. 
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[13] The rule is stated: '' ... but no person shall be dis-
qualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed 
an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such 
jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public jour-
nals, circulars, or other literature, or common notoriety; pro-
vided, it appear to the court, upon his declaration, under oath 
or otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding such an 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matters to be 
submitted to him.'' (Pen. Code, § 1076.) That test was met here. 
(See People v. Collins, 105 Cal. 504 [39 P. 16]; People v. 
Warner, 147 Cal. 546 [82 P. 196]; People v. Wolff, 182 Cal. 
728 [190 P. 22].) There is nothing in People v. Helm, 152 
Cal. 532 [93 P. 99], that requires a different result. [14] More-
over, even if the juror's testimony with respect to the test is 
conflicting, the trial court's resolution of that conflict is bind-
ing on the appellate court. (People v. Eudy, 12 Cal.2d 41 
[82 P.2d 359].) 
The trial was not fair, urges defendant, because the jury 
and judge were dominated by mob psychology and were prej-
udiced; that the jury reached a verdict in so short a time 
that it must have been prejudiced. So far as the first con-
tention is concerned, there is nothing in the record to sub-
stantiate the charge and this is the first time the claim has 
been made. Indeed, an examination of the record reveals 
the opposite of defendant's contention. 
[15] On the second point it may be noted that the jury 
took an hour and a quarter to reach its verdict on the first 
phase of the trial. While the record consists of some 1,27 4 
pages, the defendant's only defense at the trial was, as above 
stated, that defendant was so befuddled by alcohol and illness 
that he could not form an intent and was incapable of pre-
meditation or deliberation. There was no question that de-
fendant killed Florena and the eyidence of torture and pre-
meditation and that his mind was not so affected is adequate. 
Inasmueh, however, as there were no eyewitnesses to the 
killing, most of the record consists of the People's structure of 
a case based on circumstantial evidence. On the record we do 
not believe the time consumed in reaching the verdict was so 
short as to indicate a failure to consider the evidence or of 
bias or prejudice or the denial of a fair trial. 
[16] It is contended that the court was guilty of mis-
eonduct which deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the 
issue of sanity. The same jury tried both sections of the trial. 
Immediately after the jury returned its verdict to the court, 
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the latter 1·emarked: '' I1adies and g·entlemen of the jury, this 
has been a most unploasant and a most difficult duty. You 
have discharged that duty conscientiously and, in rny opinion, 
as the evidence in the case warranted!' (Emphasis added.) 
Defendant moved for a mistrial and that the jury be dis-
eharged and another impanelled to try the sanity issue. 'fhe 
motion was denied. It is asserted that the italicized comment 
was particularly prejudicial because the last witness on the 
stand to testify on the issue of defendant's guilt was a Doctor 
Toller, the People's rebuttal witness, who testified that de-
fendant did have the mental capacity to form an intent and 
was capable of premeditation and that the comment, in effect, 
told the jury that his testimony, which was fresh in the jury's 
mind, was properly believed ; that the same doctor testified 
for the People that defendant was sane at the trial of the 
sanity issue. 
In addition to the foregoing, it should be mentioned that 
at the beginning of the sanity trial, the court told the jury 
that in considering the evidence, they were "the sole judges 
of the evidence and of the credibility of the witnesses and 
[of] the weight to be given to the evidence and testimony, 
and you are to determine the issues presented upon this phase 
... without regard to any intimation,-reputed intimation, 
that may have been made heretofore concerning the determina-
tion of the issues presented upon the first phase of the case. 
Tl1e defendant is entitled to your calm, unbiased and unprej-
udiced judgment upon the issue upon which we are now to 
receive testimony. You understand that do you, ladies and 
gentlemen? (.Jurors answer in affirmative.)" At the end 
of that trial, the court again admonished the jury, saying ''The 
Court has nothing to do with the determination of questions 
of fact. Whatever the Court may have said during the progress 
of the trial, and particularly what the Court may have said at 
the conclusion of the first phase of this trial, or may intimate, 
or have intimated, in its instructions, with respect to the 
evidence, its weight, effect [sic] or sufficiency, must in no way 
influence your verdict, and if there be any such intimation 
the same must be wholly and completely disregarded by you. 
Tf, in stating to you any proposition of law the Court has 
inadvertently indicated any material fact, or facts, to have 
been proved, you will disregard such intimation and draw 
your own conclusions from the evidence herein. 'I'hat is a 
duty resting solely upon you, ladies and gentlemen, without 
intimation or guidance in any shape or manner from the 
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Court." Tt should also be pointed out that on the sanity 
issuP the proseeution presented, in addition to Dr. Toller, 
two othm· dodor,; appointed by the court, who twice examined 
defendant, and who testified he was sane. Defendant called 
several relatives and intimate friends, his personal doctor, a 
psyehologist, and a psychiatrist, who testified that defendant 
was insane. While there was a sharp conflict in the evidence, 
there was ample evidence to support the determination that 
defendant was sane. 
lt is doubtful that the error, if any, in the court's com-
ment was prejudicial in view of the adequacy of the evi-
dence, his strong admonitions to them, and the casual nature 
of the remark buried as it was in the common laudatory state-
ment regarding the performance by the jury of its duty and 
the fact that it was made before the sanity hearing began. 
'When we consider those circumstances together with the power 
of the court to comment on the credibility of testimony pro-
vided he tells the jury it is the exclusive judge of all questions 
of fact and credibility of the witnesses (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 19), we find no prejudicial error. (See People v. Ottey, 
5 Cal.2d 714 [56 P.2d 193]; People v. Patubo, 9 Cal.2d 537 
[71 P.2d 270, 113 A.L.R. 1303] ; People v. Gosden, 6 Cal.2d 14 
[56 P.2d 211] ; People v. De Moss, 4 Cal.2d 469 [50 P.2d 
1031]; People v. Eudy, supra, 12 Cal.2d 41.) At most the 
court said that in his opinion evidence was sufficient and the 
credibility of the prosecution witnesses on mental ability was 
satisfactory. The trial of the sanity issue involved an issue 
entirely different from the question of the capacity to form 
an intent in the not guilty trial (People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 
330 [202 P.2d 53]) and the jury was so instructed (as later 
discussed). Additional witnesses were offered by both sides at 
the sanity hearing. 
Defendant relies upon People v. Pokrajac, 206 Cal. 259 
f274 P. 63], where the court's remark, after the trial on the 
not guilty plea but before the sanity trial, that the jury's ver-
dict was ''undoubtedly'' a correct one was held prejudicial 
error which had not been cured by the admonition to the 
jury. The remarks there made were far stronger than those 
here involved and, too, that case was decided prior to the 
amendment to the Constitution in 1934, authorizing comment 
on the evidence. This was pointed out in People v. Busby, 
40 Cal.App,2d 193, 202 [104 P.2d 531], where, between the 
sections of the trial, the court told the jury it had acted in-
telligently: ''Appellant contends that the language of the 
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court expressed approval of the jury's verdict and had a 
tendency to minimize the importance of the insanity issue. 
As authority they cited People v. Pokrajac, 206 Cal. 259 [274 
Pac. 63], where somewhat similar comment made by the trial 
judge was held to be reversible error. 
'' ... since the Pokrajac case was reported, the amendment 
to the California Constitution, permitting the trial judge to 
<·omment upon the evidence .. has gone into effect. (Cal. Const., 
art. VI, sec. 19.) It has been held that this right of comment 
even permits a trial judge, in proper cases, to express an 
opinion as to the guilt of the defendant. (People v. Ottey, 
3 Cal.(2d) 714 [56 P.(2d) 193].) 
"The fact that the trial judge's remarks were made before 
the trial on the insanity issue rather than during its progress, 
gives rise to no distinction as the trial on the substantive 
charges and the insanity issue constitute but a single trial. 
(People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35 [273 Pac. 767] .) 
''The jurors were fully and correctly instructed as to the 
effect that they were the sole and exclusive judges of the 
effect and value of evidence and of the credibility of witnesses. 
The remarks of the trial judge did not constitute reversible 
error.'' 
[17] Defendant contends that sections 1016 and 1026 of 
the Penal Code, providing for a double plea of not guilty and 
not guilty by reason of insanity and a bifurcated trial on the 
issues, violate the due process clauses of the Constitutions of 
the United States and the State of California and that the 
cases beginning with People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35 [273 P. 767] 
and People v. Leong Fook, 206 Cal. 64 [273 P. 779], to 
the contrary should be overruled. (See, also, In re Slayback, 
209 Cal. 480 [288 P. 769]; People v. Dias, 210 Cal. 495 [292 
P. 459]; People v. D'Angelo, 13 Ca1.2d 203 [88 P.2d 708]; 
People v. Cordova, 14 Cal.2d :308 [94 P.2d 40] ; People v . 
. lh'ng, 27 Cal.2d 44:3 [164 P.2d 487] ; People v. Wells, :3:3 Cal. 
Zd ~~80 1202 P .2d 53].) We see no occasion for reconsidering 
om· decisions in those cases. No new grounds are advanred. 
[18] The right and wrong test of insanity is criticized as 
cruel and unscientific, that it is not the common or statutory 
law of this state and the cases declaring it to be the test should 
be ovenuled. 'l'he most recent reaffirmation of the test was 
made by this eourt in People v. Wells, supra, 33 Cal.2c1 3:30, 
849: ''Commission of the overt act is conceded but criminal 
g·uilt (the mental capacity to commit a criminal act) is denied 
upon the sole grotmd that at the time the overt act was 
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<·mnmitted the defendant was suffering such 'a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind . . . as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know 
it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.' (7 
Cal.Jur. § 21, p. 862; People v. Troche (1928), supra, 206 
Cal. 35, 46.) 
''. . . The standard by which the trial judge must appraise 
the admissibility of evidence in every case is, of course, the 
familiar 'right or wrong' standard hereinabove quoted, by 
which legal insanity as a defense is gauged. 
" ... Legal sanity, in a criminal case, under our court 
declared law, means 'reasoning capacity sufficient to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act he 
is doing, knowledge and consciousness that what he is doing 
is wrong and criminal and will subject him to punishment.' 
(People v. Sloper (1926), 198 Cal. 238, 245 [244 P. 362], 
and cases there cited.)'' That has been the rule since the first 
decision in this state (People v. M'Donnell, 47 Cal. 134) and 
has been followed consistently (see cases collected 7 Cal.Jur. 
862-863) despite voluminous critical writings on the subject. 
It is the generally accepted rule. ( 41 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 
§ § 33, 40; 44 A.L.R. 584; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 59; 
Wharton's Criminal Law, §§50-52; Warren on Homicide, 
§ .61.) Defendant has not offered a more workable test and 
if it is to be changed his argument should be addressed to the 
Legislature. Indeed, such attempts have been made without 
a vail. \¥ e find no valid reason, therefore, for adopting a 
different test. 
[19] Section 3604 of the Penal Code provides that punish-
ment of death shall be inflicted by the administration of ''a 
lethal gas.'' Defendant contends that the provision is invalid 
because of uncertainty in that it permits the imposition of 
eruel and unusual punishment contrary to the federal Consti-
tution in that the executioner could use a lethal gas which 
wonld cause long and cruel suffering. It is doubtful that this 
question is properly raised on this appeal since ordinarily 
we are not concerned with the execution of the judgment 
and there is no showing that such a gas has ever been used or 
will be used in this case. In any event, the contention is satis-
factorily answered in State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418 [211 P. 
676, 30 A.L.R. 1443], where similar contentions and a similar 
statute were involved. The court said: "But we are not pre-
pared to say that the infliction of the death penalty by the 
administration of lethal gas would of itself subject the victim 
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to either pain or torture. Counsel say we must take judicial 
noticr of facts and conclusions reached as the result of 
scientific research, and it is insisted that from the knowledge 
thus acquired we must declare that the law in question pro-
vides a cruel and inhuman method of enforcing the death 
penalty. ~Without undertaking to state the limitations of the 
mle invoked, we may say that if we are controlled by our 
scientifi(: knowledge of the subjeet we must reject counsel 't; 
contention. li'or many years animah; have been put to death 
painlessly by the administration of poisonous gas. Gas has 
been used for years by dental surgeons for the purpose of 
extracting teeth painlessly. No doubt gas may be admin-
istered so as to produce intense suffering. It is also true 
that one may be executed by hanging, shooting, or electrocu-
tion in such a bungling fashion as to produce the same result. 
But this is no argument again:st execution by either method. 
'' 'rhe revulsion on the part of many to the idea of execu-
tion by the administration of gas is due to an erroneous im-
pression. The average person looks upon the use of gas with 
horror, because of the experiences incident to the late war. 
'fhey forget that there are many kinds of gas, ranging from 
the harmless nonpoisonous tear gas, which may be used for the 
quelling of a mob, and the ordinary illuminating gas, which 
may produce painless death, to the highly poisonous gas which 
sears and destroys everything with which it comes in contact. 
It may be said to be a scientific fact that a painless death may 
be caused by the administration of lethal gas. That suffering 
and torture may be inflicted by its administration is no argu-
ment ag·ainst it. \V e must presume that the officials intrusted 
with the infliction of the death penalty by the use of gas will 
administer a gas which will produce no such results, and will 
carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. That they may 
not do so is no argument against the law. 
"We think it fair to assume that our Legislature, in en-
acting the law in question, sought to provide a method of in-
flicting the death penalty in the most humane manner known 
to modern science. If the argument made in behalf of the un-
constitutionality of the act is sound, the Legislature can pro-
vide no method of inflicting the death penalty other than that 
now in vogue. In other words, science and progress must halt 
when face to face with a long-established usage. Such was not 
the spirit which prompted the incorporation into our organic 
law of the provision now invoked. Every enactment of our 
IJegislature mnst be deemed in harmony with our constitu-
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tiona] provisiOns until the contrary clearly appears. The 
IJegislature has determined that the infliction of the death 
penalty by the aclministration of lethal gas is humane, and 
it would indeed be not only presumptuous, but boldness on 
our part, to substitute our judgment for theirs, even if we 
thought differently upon the matter. 
'' ... \Ve can find no ground upon which to sustain ap-
pellants' contention .... Nor do we find any merit in the 
contention that the act is indefinite and uncertain. It is cer-
tainly no more so than the act which it purports to amend. 
Rev. Laws 1912, § 7281. That statute simply said that the pun-
ishment of death should be inflicted by hanging the defendant 
by the neck until he is dead, or by shooting him, at his 
election. The present statute provides that the judgment of 
death shall be inflicted by the administration of lethal gas, 
and that a suitable and efficient inclosure and proper means 
for the administration of such gas for the purpose shall be 
provided. We cannot see that any useful purpose would be 
served by requiring greater detail. Certainly, the statute in-
fringes no provision of the Constitution.'' 
Finally, the defendant questions the jury instructions. 
[20] First, it is asserted that the instructions on reasonable 
doubt at the not guilty stage of the trial were insufficient; 
that the jury was not advised that each fact necessary for 
the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and 
particularly it was not told that intent must be so proven. 
The jury was instructed that the burden of proof was on 
the prosecution; that all presumptions are in favor of the 
accused; that if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the circumstances point to defendant's guilt he should be given 
the benefit of that doubt and a verdict of acquittal reached. 
The court quoted section 1096 of the Penal Code which states 
that the accused is presumed to be innocent, that if there is a 
reasonable doubt of his guilt he is entitled to an acquittal, 
and defines reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed that 
the plea of not guilty is a denial by him of each and every 
element of the offense charged; that the duty is on the prosecu-
tion to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime; 
that in a criminal, as distinguished from a civil case, guilt 
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; that de-
fendant's plea of not guilty puts in issue every fact alleged 
in the indictment and every material element of the crime; 
that he may rest on that denial and if the evidence did not 
satisfy it of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt he 
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should he a(•quitte(1; that in every crime thcl'C must exiflt a 
11nion, or joint OJWra1ion of ad atHl inlent (Pm1. ~ 20) 
and that a pnrson has no (•ap;wit.\· to ·~ommit a erimn if it 
was through aeeidellt aJl(l without eyiJ d(•sign or intent (Pen. 
Code, § 26) ; that ''Specific intent is an element of the offense 
charged here, and this presents a question of fact which must 
be proved like any other fact in the case'' ; that ''It is the 
Jaw of this state that an act done in the absence of the will 
is not any more the behavior of the actor than is an act done 
<'ontrary to his will. If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt 
and to a moral certainty that the defendant committed the act 
charged in the indictment, and if you further believe from 
the evidence that he was not coi1scious thereof and was not 
acting while in full possession of his will and that he could 
not formulate or hold the specific intent to commit the act 
charged, or if, from the evidence herein, you entertain a 
reasonable doubt that defendant was conscious at said time 
and was not acting in full possession of his will and could not 
formulate or hold the specific intent to commit the act 
charged, then you should find him not guilty as to said in-
dictment.'' We think the jury was adequately instructed that 
defendant must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every fact constituting the crime; the specific intent was 
an element required and, specifically, that they must find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that he had the mental capacity to 
form an intent. There were, therefore, instructions that in-
tent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[21] Moreover, under the statute no instruction on reason-
able doubt other than that specified in the Penal Code, sec-
tion 1096 need be given (Pen. Code, § 1096a) and as said in 
People v. Reed, 38 Cal.2d 423, 430 [240 P.2d 590], "The 
court may couch its instructions defining the elements of the 
offense in the language of the code where no instructions in 
elaboration or exposition of the principles of the statutory 
definitions are requested by tbe defendant. (People v. 
Treschenko, 159 Cal. 456, 458 [114 P. 578] .) Even if such 
an instruction 'cannot be commended as a. full or clear ex-
position of the meaning of the section of the code, still it 
cannot be said that it was error for the court in giving the 
law to have conformed to the language of the code, and to 
have omitted what that code itself omits.' (PeopLe v. Dobbins, 
138 Cal. 694, 698 [72 P. 339].) The defendant will not be 
heard to complain where he has failed to request an amplifica-
40 C.2d-211 
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tion of an instruction in that form. (People v. Laird, 69 Cal. 
App. 511, 514 [231 P. 596] .) 
''. . . The court's instruction on the presumption of inno-
cence and defining reasonable doubt followed the language 
of section 1096 of the Penal Code. By additional instructions, 
the court explained the effect of the presumption and stated 
the doctrine of reasonable doubt. 
"These instructions, Reed complains, are only general. No 
instruction was given to the effect that each element of the 
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. But the 
law expressly specifies that the court may read section 1096 
of the Penal Code and need not give any other instruction on 
the presumption of innocence or reasonable doubt. (Pen. 
Code, § 1096a.) Considering all of the instructions, it appears 
that the jury was fully and fairly instructed as to all of the 
rules of law applicable to the evidence.'' 
[22] Second, it is claimed that the instructions on torture 
were in error. The instructions given were in the language 
defining torture in Peop~e v. Martinez, supra, 38 Cal.2d 556, 
561, and there is, therefore, no error. 
[23] Third, complaint is made of instructions in the in-
sanity stage of the trial. The court refused to give defendant's 
instruction that he need not prove his insanity beyond a 
reasonable doubt but need only prove it by a preponderance 
of the evidence, defining the latter clause. In the insanity 
stage of the trial the burden of proof rests on defendant to 
prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. (People 
v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d 52 [198 P.2d 865] and cases there cited.) 
Hence defendant's offered instruction was correct. In con-
nection with the court's refusal to give this instruction, de-
fendant particularly complains of the instruction hereafter 
to be mentioned. 
[24] The jury was instructed that it was not to rely upon 
any particular instruction but to take them as a whole; that 
defendant was entitled to the full benefit of the defense of 
insanity if it believed that the defense had been established 
by a "preponderance of the evidence"; that it was the sole 
judge of the evidence and credibility of witnesses; that it was 
to give defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt (this 
should probably not have been given) ; that ''To the charge 
of murder made against the defendant he has interposed the 
plea ·of 'not guilty' and 'not guilty by reason of insanity.' 
The law requires that where such pleas are entered, the de-
fendant must first be tried under the general issue of 'not 
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guilt_y', during which tr:ial he is conclusively presumed to 
ha'Ve been legally sane at the time the offense is alleged to 
have been committed; all evidence relating to the q_uestion of 
legal sanity of. the accused being excluded, and, at the con-
clusion of such trial the defendant shall· be. tried 1lPO:il the 
issue of legal insanity. Accordingly, in the present case, during 
the first phase of this trial under the general issue of 'twt 
guilty,' the defendant was conclusivel;v presumed to be sane, 
and any evidence bearing upon the question of his legal sarrl,ty 
was not relevant to that issue and you were precluded. by the 
law from considering the question of the legal sanity of the 
defendant on the first phase of this trial. The first phase of 
this trial having resulted in a verdict (}f guilty, the defendant 
is entitled under his plea of 'not guilty by reason of legal m· 
sanity' to a trial upon that issue and to introduce any legal 
evidence tending t.o establish. such plea. 
"The defendant in this case . heretofore has been charged 
with the crime of murder and has been found guilty of th~t 
oil'ense, except in this respect: That defendant has entered a 
plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity', thereby alleging 
that Jle was insane at the time of the commission of the of-
fense. . . . The issue :raised by that plea of insanity . now 
must be determined,, because the law does not hoM. a person 
criminally accountable for his conduct if at the time th~:re9:f 
he was insane." . ~nsanity was defined for the jury and it 
was told that if it believed from a upreponderance'' of the 
evidence that defendant was insane it should so find; that 
''The. burden of proving insanity . is on ·the defendant; that 
is to say, it is incumbent. upon him to establish by a pre-
·poi:lderance of evidence that he was insane. ·. . . 
''.The law presum~ that the· defendant was. sane ..• That pre-
sumption may be rebutted but is controlling until overcome 
by a preponderance of evidence. . . . 
''.The rule requiring the de£endant, where insanity is inter-
posed as a defense, to prove it by .. it preponderance of the 
evil!ence does not affect the other· rule. that the ·burden of 
proving·sanity is on the pl"osecution. The burden.has always 
b~en .on the prosecution and is met . in the :first i11stance by 
the :presumption of sanity which. the law rais~.s ~nd which 
must prevail.until it is overcome, The rule relating to the de-
f(lnse of insanity does not shift the burden of proof from 
th~? People to the de:fend~nt, but only. shifts the burden. of 
~trotincing evidence and declares. the amonp~. or quantum of 
evidence which he must produce to overcome the presumption 
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and show his insanity. The present status does not take away 
the defense of insanity, and the procedure followed has in no 
way changed or affected the rule respecting the burden which 
rests on the prosecution and on the defense in this case. 
"It follows, therefore, that the burden on the prosecution 
of proving the sanity of the defendant at the time of the 
commission of the crime of which he has been found guilty, 
namely, murder of the first degree, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
is met by the pr-esumption of sanity, and the bur-den of 
establishing the defense of insanity of the defendant is upon 
him, to establish such insanity at the time of the commission 
of the crime of which he has been convicted, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence," (emphasis added). Other instructions 
referred to preponderance of the evidence and gave more 
detailed definitions of insanity. 
The italicized portion of the instructions, supra, is prej-
udicially erroneous, asserts defendant, because it in effect 
told the jury that the prosecution had to prove sanity beyond 
a reasonable doubt and that it had done so by the presumption 
of sanity; that, therefore, in effect, defendant would have to 
overcome a presumption of sanity beyond a reasonable .doubt 
and that means more than by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 
There is no doubt that the instruction is confusing and 
should not have been given. However, it may reasonably be 
interpreted to mean that even though the prosecution was 
relieved of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt yet the 
defendant could establish his insanity by a preponderance of 
the evidence and that construction is clearly in harmony with 
the other instructions on the subject that a preponderance 
of the evidence was all defendant needed to produce. 
[25] There has been considerable discussion with refer-
ence to the correct rule in regard to who carries the burden 
in the sanity stage of the trial. (See 26 Cal.L.Rev. 543; 2 So. 
Cal.L.Rev. 53; 3 ibid. 1; 21 Cal.L.Rev. 65; 26 Cal.L.Rev. 
544.) It was held in People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [268 
P. 909, 270 P. 1117], that the rule is the same now as it was 
before the bifurcated trial provision which was enacted in the 
1927 amendment to section 1026 of the Penal Code. In the 
Hickman case, sttpra, it was held that a person is presumed 
to be sane and ''The rule requiring the defendant, where in-
sanity is interposed as a defense, to prove it by a preponder-
a11ce of the evidence, does not affect the other rule that the 
burden of proving sanity is on the prosecution. That burden 
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has always been on it and is met in the first instance by the 
presumptiol'l of sanity which the Jaw raises and whiCh must 
prevail until it is overcome. The rule relating' to the defense 
of insanity does not shift the bm·den of proof from the People 
to the defendant, but only shifts the burden of introducing 
evidence and declares the amount or quantum of evidence 
which he must produce to overcome the presumption and show 
llis insanity. (People v. Harris, 169 Cal. 53, 68 [145 Pac. 
520] .) " (People v. Hickman, supra, 204 Cal. 470, 477.) But 
the cases also have stated that the burden is on the defendant to 
prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. "There are 
statements in a number of cases to the effect that in a separate 
trial on the issue of sanity the defendant has the burden of 
proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. (People 
v. McLachlan, 13 Cal.2d 45, 55 [87 P.2d 825]; People v. 
French, 12 Cal.2d 720, 734 [87 P.2d 1014] ; People v. Troche, 
206 Cal. 35, 49 [273 P. 767] ; People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 
477 [268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117] .) " (People v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d 
52, 65 [198 P.2d 865] .) 'l'hat is the more appropriate way to 
instruct the jury. 
[26] Defendant contends that the instructions on delibera-
tion and intent were improper. The jury was instructed in 
the language of sections 187-189 of the Penal Code, as to man-
slaughter and the degrees of murder, and as to murder of the 
first degree. It was told that to constitute first degree murder 
the killing must be by torture as defined, or wilful act accom-
panied by malice together with a clear and deliberate intent 
to take life. It was told that the intent must be the result of 
deliberation and must be formed on preexisting reflection and 
not under heat of passion or such other condition as to preclude 
deliberation. ''The law does not undertake to measure in units 
of time the length of the period during which the thought 
must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill 
which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will 
vary with different individuals and under varying circum-
stances. The true test is not the duration of time, but rather 
the extent of the reflection. 'rhoughts may follow each other 
with great rapidity and a cold, calculated judgment and de-
cision may be arrived at quickly. However, the express re-
quirement for a concurrence of deliberation and premeditation 
excludes from murder of the first degree those homicides not 
specifically enumerated in the statutes. To constitute a de-
liberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and 
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and 
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against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, 
decide to and commit the unlawful act causing death. . . . 
"The adjective 'deliberate' means formed, arrived at or de-
termined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing 
of considerations; as a deliberate judgment or plan; carried 
on coolly and steadily, according to a preconceived design; 
given to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice 
or decision ; careful in considering the consequences of a step ; 
unhurried; characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not 
rash. The word 'deliberate' is an antonym of 'hasty, impet-
uous, rash, impulsive.' 
"The verb 'premeditate' means 'to think on, and revolve 
in the mind, beforehand; to contrive and design previously.' 
''Thus, to find the defendant guilty of murder of the first 
degree, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and 
to a moral certainty that the unlawful killing was accom-
panied with a deliberate and clear intention to take life. The 
intent to kill must be the result of deliberate premeditation ; 
it must be formed upon a pre-existing reflection, and not upon 
a sudden heat of passion sufficient to preclude the idea of 
deliberation. It is necessary that the act of killing be pre-
ceded by a concurrence of will, deliberation and premedita-
tion on the part of the slayer." Those instructions satisfy the 
requirements of the law as most recently stated by this 
court. (People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768, 777-778 [228 P.2d 
281].) 
The judgment and order denying a motion for a new trial 
are a:ffirmeP.. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing and modification was 
denied May 28, 1953. 
